Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms by Tobias, Carl W.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1995
Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms
Carl W. Tobias
University of Richmond, ctobias@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 699 (1995)
ESSAY 
Common Sense and Other 
Legal Reforms 
Carl Tobias* 
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................... 700 
II. BACKGROUND OF LEGAL REFORMS .•..••••••....•..•••••••..•..••.•••. 702 
A. Procedural Reforms ............................................... 702 
B. 
1. Processes for Adopting and Revising 
Federal Procedures..................................... 702 
2. Federal Civil Justice Reform ..................... 711 
a. Congressional Civil 
Justice Reform ............................... . 
b. Executive Branch Civil 
Justice Reform ............................... . 
3. A Note on State Procedures and 
State Civil Justice Reform ........................ . 
Substantive Reforms ............................................. . 
1. Products Liability ...................................... . 







* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Chris Fiann, Peggy Sanner, 
Rod Smith, and Fran Wells for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wtlmerton 
for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I also want to 
thank Third Branch personnel, particularly in the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts and the Federal Judicial Center, for their tireless efforts in responding to my requests 
for assistance. 
I am a member of the Advisory Group that the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana appointed under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and of the Local 
District Rules Review Committee that the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council named under the 
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988. However, the views expressed in this 
Essay and the errors that remain are mine. 
699 
700 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:699 
Ill. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON SENSE 
LEGAL REFORMSAc:r ......................................................... 721 
A. Rule 11 ................................................................... 721 
B. Securities Litigation Reform Act ........................... 724 
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ................................ 727 
D. Notice Requirement................................................ 728 
E. Fee-Shifting in Diversity Cases ..... ........................ 729 
F. Products Liability.................................................. 731 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE ........................................ 734 
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 737 
I. lNTRODUc:rION 
The Contract with America (the "Contract") was the 
centerpiece of the Republican Party's strategy in the 1994 
congressional campaigns. The Common Sense Legal Reforms Act 
("CSLRA'') was the ninth tenet and a critical constituent of the 
Contract, which the Republican Party promised that the new 
Congress would vote upon within one hundred days. Once the Grand 
Old Party swept into office, capturing the House of Representatives 
for the first time in four decades, many members of Congress were 
expressly committed to honoring the Contract with America. 
Accordingly, nearly one hundred Republican sponsors introduced the 
Common Sense Legal Refonns Act during the initial week of the 
104th Congress, and the measure rapidly progressed through the 
House of Representatives.1 
1. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 1995). The Republican Party leadership 
decided against attempting to pass H.R. 10 in one bill as introduced. Many provisions included 
in H.R. 10, therefore, now appear in numerous other pieces of legislation. See, for example, 
Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, H.R. 917, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 1995); 
Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 
15, 1995); Atterney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 16, 1995); 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Congress, 1st Sess. (Feb. 27, 1995). The 
Republicans have discarded virtually none of the original constituents of H.R. 10, however. 
Congress will consider and may ultimately adopt most of the provisions of the CSLRA as 
components of other legislation that passed the House of Representatives during the week of 
March 6, 1995. See H.R. 956, H.R. 988, and H.R. 1058. For convenience of analysis, I primarly 
treat the proposals included in the CSLRA (H.R. 10), supplementing that evaluation with 
assessment of specific aspects of the recently passed legislation which are most relevant to the 
issues examined in this Essay. Nevertheless, I realize that certain features of the measures 
that the House adopted improved H.R. 10 as originally introduced. I intend to emphasize 
numerous systemic factors that the legislation implicates, rather than to catalog 
comprehensively the particular constituents of the legislation, even while recognizing that the 
whole may be more than the sum of its parts. 
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This legislation would impose procedural and substantive 
reforms that could significantly affect much federal civil litigation and 
could have substantial systemic impacts on the civil justice process. 
For instance, the measure's advocates drafted and introduced the 
proposed legislation with little apparent appreciation for how it might 
conflict with a number of ongoing public and private reform initia-
tives, such as an earlier Congress's Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
and the American Law Institute's efforts to adopt a Third 
Restatement of Torts governing products liability. 
The bill's enactment, therefore, could additionally complicate 
the increasingly complex civil justice system. Indeed, certain of the 
measure's provisions may impose greater expense and delay in civil 
litigation, thereby exacerbating numerous current problems rather 
than producing the reforms' ostensible purpose of ameliorating the 
difficulties. These phenomena mean that the Common Sense Legal 
Reforms Act warrants analysis. This Essay undertakes that effort. 
Part II of this Essay examines the backdrop against which the 
proponents of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act drafted the legis-
lation. The Part emphasizes those continuing public and private law 
reform efforts with which many provisions of the measure promise to 
conflict. 
Part III descriptively analyzes the specific procedural and 
substantive requirements of the CSLRA and considers particular 
provisions' adverse effects on individual cases, ongoing reform 
initiatives, and the civil justice system. The Part finds that numerous 
statutory prescriptions will have deleterious impacts on plaintiffs and 
resource-poor litigants by, for instance, restricting their federal court 
access. The act may also disrupt continuing civil justice reform 
efforts, thus enhancing complexity and disuniformity in federal civil 
procedure and concomitantly increasing litigation cost and delay. 
Part IV affords suggestions for the future. These recommenda-
tions principally urge Congress to reject or delay the passage of the 
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act. If Congress remains unpersuaded 
that the legislation will have numerous detrimental effects on much 
civil litigation and on the broader civil justice system, or if Congress 
At the time that this Essay went to press in early April, the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation was preparing to mark up and vote on the Product 
Liability Fairness Act of 1995, S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 15, 1995), which is the 
Senate analogue of H.R. 956, while Senator Orrin Hatch, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, was introducing the Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1995, S. 672, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Apr. 4, 1995), which essentially combines the provisions of H.R. 956 and H.R. 988. 
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chooses to proceed for other reasons, it should at least consider addi-
tional options. For example, Congress should not enact the CSLRA 
provisions that will conflict with ongoing reform initiatives. 
II. BACKGROUND OF LEGAL REFORMS 
The origins and development of the numerous legal reforms 
which comprise the backdrop against which the sponsors of the 
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act developed the proposed legislation 
warrant comparatively comprehensive treatment in this Essay, al-
though that background has been rather extensively assessed else-
where.2 Relatively thorough examination is justified because most of 
the initiatives have long, rich, and complex histories that inform un-
derstanding of the CSLRA, particularly by illustrating how those who 
drafted the new measure apparently did so without fully taking into 
account earlier endeavors. This Part primarily examines procedural 
reforms, by considering initiatives that relate to the processes for 
adopting and revising federal civil procedures and by studying certain 
federal civil justice reforms, and secondarily explores substantive 
reforms, principally by treating efforts regarding products liability 
law. 
A Procedural Reforms 
1. Processes for Adopting and Revising Federal Procedures 
After decades of contentious debate, Congress passed the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, which authorized the United States Supreme 
Court to prescribe rules of practice for civil cases in the federal dis-
trict courts.3 The next year, the Court appointed the original Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules ("Advisory Committee"), which included 
2. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal 
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795 (1991); Carl Tobias, Improving the 
1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Act, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1589 (1994). 
3. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2071-77 (1988 & S~pp. 1993). For additional discussion of this act's origins and implications, 
see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 
(1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987); Carl Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 4 Cornell L. Rev. 270 (1989). I rely 
substantially in this section on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1589. 
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fourteen practitioners and law professors.4 The Advisory Committee 
completed its draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("the 
Rules") in 1937, the Supreme Court approved the package as 
submitted essentially intact, and the Rules became effective in 1938. 5 
The members of the Advisory Committee meant to rectify the 
difficulties posed by common law and code procedure, such as their 
very technical character.6 The drafters sought to write a procedural 
code that would be simple, uniform, and trans-substantive; that 
would foster the expeditious, inexpensive disposition of civil cases; 
and that would encourage merits-based resolution of disputes.7 The 
Federal Rules required every federal district court to apply identical 
procedures.8 Rule 83, however, provided an exception; it permitted 
each district to adopt local procedures which were not inconsistent 
with the Federal Rules, thereby enabling the courts to undermine the 
uniform, simple procedural system that the Rules had instituted.9 
The Federal Rules seemed to work reasonably well during the 
thirty years following their adoption.10 Numerous developments, 
however, led to growing dissatisfaction with the Rules by the mid-
1970s. Many judges and attorneys and a small number of writers 
claimed that the federal courts were experiencing a litigation explo-
sion in which parties were filing too many cases, too few of which had 
4. See, for example, Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 971-73; Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 
273. 
5. See Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 970-73; Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 273. 
6. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 439 (1986) (discussing the technical character of common law 
and code procedure and the liberality ofF.R.C.P. pleading requirements); Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. at 956-61 (discussing the technical character of common law and code procedure and the 
"pro-simplicity theme" proposed by committee members). See also Rescoe Pound, The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 AB.A. Rep. 395, 405-06 (1906) 
(calling for elimination of "sporting theory" of justice). See generally Charles E. Clark, 
Procedure-The Handmaid of Justice (West, 1965). 
7. See generally Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading 
of the Rules, 84 Yale L. J. 718 (1975). See also Judith Rosnik, Failing Faith: Adjadicatory 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 502-15 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, A New Era in 
American Civil Procedure, 67 AB.A. J. 1648, 1649-51 (1981); Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 272-
77 (cited in note 3). See also Resnik, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 498-99, 508 (recounting difficulties of 
discerning intent of drafters who worked half-century ago); Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 274 
(same). 
8. See, for example, Subrin, 67 AB.A. J. at 1650; Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 274-75. 
9. See F.R.C.P. 83 and Advisory Committee Note (finding that the restriction on adoption 
of inconsistent local procedures has been honored in the breach). 
10. See generally Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, 58 
Colum. L. Rev. 435 (1958); Resnik, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 515-16 (cited in note 7); Tobias, 74 
Cornell L. Rev. at 277-78 (cited in note 3). 
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merit.11 Some judges and lawyers expressed concern about abuse of 
the civil litigation process and urged courts to sanction attorneys and 
parties who engaged in this activity, while a number of critics as-
serted that the uniform, simple, flexible regime instituted in the 
Federal Rules made possible these complications.12 
The proliferation of local procedures became another signifi-
cant source of growing discontent with federal civil procedure.13 Many 
of these local requirements, most of which have been prescribed dur-
ing the last two decades, are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provisions of the United States Code, or local proce-
dures in other federal districts. 
The Judicial Conference of the United States, the policymaking 
arm of the federal courts, responded to these concerns in several 
ways. The conference supported the adoption of the 1983 amend-
ments to Federal Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26. The revisions were intended 
to be an integrated package that would increase attorneys' responsi-
bilities to act as officers of the court and enhance judicial control over 
civil litigation, particularly during the pre-trial process.14 Rules 16 
and 26 respectively increased judicial authority during pre-trial con-
ferences and discovery.15 The amendments to Rules 16 and 26 em-
11. See, for example, Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 AD.-A Need for Systematic 
Anticipation, in A. Leo Levin and Russell Wheeler, eds., The Pound Conference: Perspectives on 
Justice in the Future 23 (West, 1979); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have 
Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in Levin and Wheeler, eds., The Pound Conference at 211-12. See 
also Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 287-89 (reviewing debate over litigation explosion). 
12. See, for example, National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 
642-43 (1976) (upholding sanctious imposed for disobeyance of discovecy orders and recognizing 
importance of penalizing and deterring discovecy abuse); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975) (deccying the extensive discovecy available in securities 
litigation); Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) 
(Powell, J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Order's modification 
of the F.R.C.P. as too modest to limit the Rules' potential abuse). See generally Arthur R. 
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Pheenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1984) (giving several 
reasons for the inefficiency of the current judicial process). 
13. See, for example, N.D. Cal. R. 235-7, reprinted in Robert F. Peckham, The Federal 
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 Cal. 
L. Rev. 770, 776-77 n.30 (1981) (prescn"bingpreliminacy meetinge, preparation of pretrial order 
by attorneys rather than judge, and other procedural details). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil 
Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. 1393 (1992). 
14. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See also 
Subrin, 67 AB.A. J. at 1650 (cited in note 7) (arguing that the amended rules would increase 
atterneys' responsibilities and judicial control and would complicate civil procedure). See 
generally Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 
43 Rutgers L. Rev. 933 (1991) (discussing the effects of the 1983 amendments on civil litigants); 
Arthur R. Miller, The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Promoting 
Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility (Fed. Judicial Center, 1984) (discussing 
the background, integrated nature, and objectives of the 1983 amendments). 
15. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097, 1102, 1104 
(1983). 
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powered judges to impose sanctions for those provisions' violation, 
while Rule 11 mandated thatjudges sanction those who failed to con-
duct reasonable prefiling inquiries or who filed deficient papers.16 
The Judicial Conference provided two responses to the 
problems posed by local procedural proliferation. It supported the 
1985 amendment of Rule 83, specifically requiring that districts adopt 
or amend local rules only after affording public notice and opportunity 
for comment and which required that individual judges' standing 
orders not conflict with the Federal Rules or with local rules.17 
The conference also created the Local Rules Project to 
assemble and analyze all local procedures.18 The project undertook a 
thoroughgoing study and reported that the district courts had 
promulgated five thousand local rules, many of which contravened the 
Federal Rules, and that there were thousands of additional local 
prescriptions that governed local practice.19 The conference reacted to 
the project's findings by issuing an order that asked all federal 
districts to conform these local procedures to the Federal Rules. 20 
Some judges, attorneys, and commentators expressed growing 
concerns with the rule revision processes themselves.21 Congressional 
activity may reflect some of this dissatisfaction. During 1973, 
Congress intervened in the national procedural amendment process 
and nullified considerable work of Judicial Conference committees by 
enacting legislation that replaced the Federal Rules of Evidence that 
had been adopted by the Supreme Court the preceding year.22 In 
16. Id. at 1100. 
17. F.R.C.P. 83. 
18. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Report of the Local Rules Project: Local Rules on Civil Practice 1 (Sept. 1989). 
See generally Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers, and Stephen N. Subrin, The Role of Local 
Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (Jan. 1989) (providing summary of Local Rules Project). 
19. See Report of the Local Rules Project at 1. See also Coquillette, Squiers, and Subrin, 
75 A.B.A. J. at 62-65 (discussing the significance of the proliferation oflocal rules). 
20. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, Project Director, Local Rules Project 
(Feb. 21, 1992); Telephone Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, Consultant, Local Rules Project 
(Feb. 15, 1992). 
21. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 
Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1976) (suggesting reforms to the exercise of judicial rulemaking powers); 
Winifred R. Brown, Federal Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities (Fed. Judicial Centor, 
1981) (outlining the rulemaking process and criticizing proposals for change). See also Tobias, 
46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1598 n.55 (cited in note 2) (discussing Congress' intervention in national rule 
revision). 
22. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). See also Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 27-29 
(Aug. 26, 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987-89 (describing congressional 
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197 4, Congress postponed for a year the date on which the amended 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were to take effect.23 During the 
early 1980s, Congress rewrote a revision of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4 that the Court had promulgated.24 
One half-century after the original Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure became effective Congress passed the Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act ("JIA'') of 1988, which was 
"intended to modernize, regularize and open the national and local 
procedural amendment processes.''25 The statute was meant to 
restore the primacy of, and reinvigorate, the national rule revision 
process by opening it to greater public involvement, effectively 
analogizing the process to notice-comment rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.26 
Congress in the JIA correspondingly attempted to ameliorate 
the proliferation of local procedures by placing strictures on their 
adoption and revision that were similar to those for Federal Rule 
intervention by enacting legislation replacing the Federal Rules of Evidence); Act of Jan. 2, 
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
In September 1992, the Judicial Conference, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, 
suggested that Chief Justice William Rehnquist reactivate an Advisory Committee on Federal 
Rules of Evidence. In the winter of 1993, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the committee, 
which Judge Ralph K Wmter chairs and which Professor Margaret Berger serves as reporter. 
The committee held its initial meeting in May, 1993. Telephone Interview with John Rabiej, 
Chief, Rules Support Staff, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (March 23, 1995). See 
generally 150 F.R.D. 330 (1994) (affording Advisory Committee membership); 147 F.R.D. 282 
(1993) (recommending approval of the amendments to the federal rules of evidence and that 
proposed amendment of Rule 702 be referred te new Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of 
Evidence). See also Edward R. Becker and Aviva Orenstein; The Federal Rules of Euidence 
After Sixteen Years-The Effect of 'Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need for an Aduisory 
Committee on the Rules of Euidence, and Suggestions for Selectiue Reuision of the Rules, 60 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 857 (1993). 
23. Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397 (1974), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3771 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-
examination, 61 AB.A. J. 579, 579 (1975). See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice 
Act, H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5982, 5987 (noting that after 1973 Congress frequently interceded to "delay the effective date of, 
disapprove, or modify rules and amendments"). 
24. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 
Stat. 2527 (1983); Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Ciuil Rules: The Summons, 63 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 733, 733 (1988) (discussing prospects for reform in F.R.C.P. 4). 
25. Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1599 (cited in note 2). See also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5987 
(outlining the purposes and providing legislative history of the JIA); 28 U.S.C. §§ 207l(b), 2073 
(1988 & Supp. 1993) (delineating court rulemaking authority). See generally Mullenix, 69 N.C. 
L. Rev. at 830-32 (cited in note 2) (discussing the democratization of the rulemaking process 
effectsd by JIA's passage). 
26. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (prescribing administrative procedures 
particularly for notice-comment rulemaking); 28 U.S.C. §§ 207l(b), 2073 (1988 & Supp. 1993) 
(delineating court rulemaking powers). 
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amendment.27 The legislation imposed public notice and comment 
procedures on all of the districts and required every district to name a 
local rules committee to advise all judges of the court in prescribing 
and modifying local rules.28 The statute also required each of the 
twelve circuit judicial councils to review periodically all local proce-
dures for consistency and to change or abolish those deemed inconsis-
tent.29 
The first test of the JIA modifications to the national rule revi-
sion process was the adoption of the 1993 Federal Rules amend-
ments.30 I concentrate on the revision in Rule 11 because its 1983 
amendment became the most controversial change in the Federal 
Rules' history and because the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act 
would fundamentally alter the 1993 amendment, effectively reinsti-
tuting the 1983 version.31 
The 1983 modification of Rule 11 was controversial for several 
reasons. That revision's principal purpose was to deter frivolous 
litigation by encouraging attorneys to "stop and think" before filing 
papers. The Advisory Committee Note which accompanied the 
amendment confirmed that deterrence was the revision's primary 
objective, 32 but the revision also provided that judges might award 
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, when the Rule was 
contravened.33 Numerous lawyers seized on this confusion regarding 
the provision's compensatory purpose and invoked the Rule in an 
effort to recover attorney's fees, while a number of judges were re-
sponsive to these requests and made attorney fee-shifting the sanc-
tion of choice. 34 
27. See Historical and Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (noting 
that Congress imposed broad responsibilities on federal judiciary to achieve uniformity of rules). 
28. See id. (imposing public notice procedures). 
29. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4) (1988). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(l) (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
30. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure and Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993) 
("1993 Amendments''). 
31. See notes 118-29 and accompanying text. The 1993 amendment of Rule 26 to impose 
automatic disclosure was also quite significant. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Rule 4 
was substantially revised as well. See note 24 and accompanying text. 
32. See F.R.C.P. 11, 1983 Advisory Committee's Note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199-200 
(1983) (stressing the new amendment's detorrent function). 
33. 1983 amendment of F.R.C.P. 11; F.R.C.P. 11, 1983 Advisory Committee's Note, re-
printed in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983). 
34. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling'' 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Georgetown L. J. 1313, 
1327, 1340 (1986) (discussing confusion); Elizabeth Wiggins, Thomas Willging, and Donna 
Stientra, Rule 11: Final Report toAduisory Committee On Ciuil Rules of the Judicial Conference 
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The pursuit of compensation fostered much expensive, unnec-
essary satellite litigation unrelated to the merits of lawsuits. 35 
Unclear phrasing and inconsistent judicial interpretation of the 
amendment correspondingly contributed to satellite litigation. 36 Some 
counsel also employed Rule 11 for strategic purposes, such as threat-
ening less powerful litigants in ways that were intended to discourage 
their vigorous pursuit of litigation.37 
Many of the above factors disadvantaged resource-poor liti-
gants, such as civil rights plaintiffs.38 Rule 11 was invoked against, 
and sanctions were levied on, civil rights plaintiffs more often than 
any other class of federal civil litigant, 39 and judges correspondingly 
imposed large sanctions on some of them.40 The possibility of Rule 11 
sanctions chilled the parties, whose lack of resources and power made 
them risk-averse and vulnerable to the Rule's invocation.41 The 1983 
amendment did afford some benefits, such as deterring the pursuit of 
frivolous litigation.42 
The national rule revision entities-particularly those, such as 
the Advisory Committee, which had principal responsibility for devel-
oping proposals for rules amendments-faithfully and carefully 
implemented the JIA's requirements respecting the revision process. 
During August 1991, the Advisory Committee issued a preliminary 
draft of proposed amendments and sought and received much public 
comment in writing and in two public hearings.43 The committee was 
of the United States § lB at 9 (Fed. Judicial Center, 1991) (stating that attorney's fees were 
sanction of choice). 
35. See, for example, Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 
485, 514 (1989). See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1943-54 (1989) (addressing the 
need for lawyers and clients to exercise restraint in consuming judicial resources with Rule 11 
litigation). 
36. Burbank, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1930-31; Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the 
Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1775, 1776 (1992). 
37. See, for example, Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 855, 876-77 
(1992) (discussing Rule ll's "threat and retreat" aspect). See also Nelken, 74 Georgetown L. J. 
at 1327, 1340 (cited in note 34) (noting the high level ofRule·n motions in civil rights cases). 
38. Id.; Tobias, 37 Buff. L. Rev. at 503-06 (cited in note 35) (referring to the Rule's "chilling 
effect"); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988) (same). 
39. Nelken, 74 Georgetown L. J. at 1327, 1340; Vairo, 118 F.R.D. at 200-01. 
40. See, for example, Blue v. United States Department of the Anny, 914 F.2d 525, 548-49 
(4th Cir. 1990); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 513-21 (4th Cir. 1990). 
41. See Tobias, 37 Buff. L. Rev. at 495-98 (cited in note 35); Vairo, 118 F.R.D. at 200-01 
(cited in note 38). 
42. Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 503-
05 (1990); William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1014-15 (1988). 
43. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) ("Preliminary Draft of 
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responsive to public criticism and apparently made good faith efforts 
to improve the drafts. It even inverted the usual rule revision 
sequence for Rule 11 by soliciting public comment prior to drafting a 
proposal. 44 
Notwithstanding the Committee's thorough evaluation of the 
1983 amendment, its responsiveness to public input, and its attempt 
to write a new Rule that would fairly treat all federal civil litigants, 45 
most parties which would have been affected by the preliminary draft 
of Rule 11 expressed dissatisfaction with the proposal.46 For instance, 
resource-poor litigants found that the draft was insufficiently respon-
sive to the difficulties of satellite litigation and chilling effects. 
Defense counsel were troubled by the draft's restrictions on recovery 
of attorney's fees for Rule violations. 
The Advisory Committee responded to this criticism by writing 
several additional drafts and by attempting to develop the fairest, 
clearest revision possible.47 Indeed, the committee endeavors repre-
sent the type of open, responsive revision process and rational deci-
sionmaking that Congress envisioned when changing the rule revision 
process in the 1988 Act.48 
Despite the committee's commendable efforts, numerous indi-
viduals and interests continued to oppose the 1993 revision.49 The 
most prominent critic was Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, 
who dissented from the Supreme Court's transmittal of the amended 
Proposed Amendments"). See also Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Reuisited, 14 Nat'! L. 
J. 1, 12-13 (May 4, 1992) (discussing preliminary draft and public comment). See generally Hon. 
William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1 (1993) 
44. See Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure and 
Related Rules, as Amended in 1983, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) ("Call for Written Comments"). 
45. See Tobias, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 861-65 (cited in note 37) (discussing these aspects 
of the committee's actions); Call for Written Comments, 131 F.R.D. at 345 (outlining the 
committee's plan and geals concerning public comments on the 1983 amendment). 
46. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1608 (cited in note 
2). See also Carl Tobias, Rule Reuision Roundelay, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 236, 236-39 (describing 
dissatisfaction with preliminary draft in a letter te the editors). 
47. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 46 (July 1992); Tobias, 
46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 859-65 (cited in note 37); Carl Tobias, The 1993 Reuision of Federal Rule 
11, 70 Ind. L. J. 171, 176-88 (1994) (tracing the process employed in draftingthe amended Rule). 
48. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text. See generally Mullenix, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795 
(cited in note 2); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Ciuil Rulemaking, 61 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 455 (1993). 
49. See Tobias, 70 Ind. L. J. at 186-88 (cited in note 47) (discussing the Supreme Court 
and Congressional objections). 
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Rule, contending that it would "eliminate a significant and necessary 
deterrent to frivolous litigation."50 
In the final analysis, the 1993 revision of Rule 11 is signifi-
cantly better than the 1983 amendment. The 1993 revision includes a 
safe harbor for parties who allegedly contravene the Rule, specifically 
excludes discovery from the provision's purview, entrusts sanctioning 
for Rule violations to judicial discretion, and sharply restricts those 
instances in which courts can impose the sanction of attorney's fees.51 
Therefore, the 1993 version should decrease incentives to invoke the 
Rule improperly and correspondingly reduce expense and delay as-
cribed to satellite litigation. The new Rule 11 is a balanced, workable 
compromise, given the restraints on rule revision, such as the need to 
satisfy constituencies as diverse as the federal judiciary and plaintiffs' 
and defense counsel. 
The 1988 JIA requirements relating to local rule revision have 
received limited implementation as compared to the national rule 
amendment provisions exemplified by the 1993 modification of Rule 
11.52 Most of the ninety-four districts have named local rules commit-
tees. A number of districts have formalized processes for promulgat-
ing and changing local procedures and have opened the processes to 
public participation, while some have adopted new, or revised, exist-
ing local procedures pursuant to the processes. 
Only a small number of districts have effectuated the JIA's 
mandates relating to local procedural proliferation. 53 For instance, a 
minuscule number of courts have attempted to limit local procedural 
requirements, and virtually none have modified inconsistent local 
procedures. The Seventh Circuit Judicial Council may be the sole 
council that has modified or abrogated conflicting local requirements. 
Numerous considerations probably explain the limited effec-
tuation of this aspect of the Judicial Improvements Act. Perhaps 
most important, as discussed in detail below, civil justice reform 
initiatives, principally instituted by Congress in the Civil Justice 
Reform Act ("CJRA") of 1990, but also by the Executive Branch in 
50. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure and Forms, reprinted in 146 
F.R.D. 402, 507-10 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Dissenting Statement"). 
51. See F.R.C.P. ll(c)-(d), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; Tobias, 77 Iowa L. Rev. at 
1783-88 (cited in note 36). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the amendment has had its in-
tended effects. See Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, 81 AB.A. J. 12, 12 (March 
1995). 
52. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1604-06 (cited in 
note 2); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Reuiew of Local Procedures, 52 Wash. & Lee 
L. Rev. 359 (1995). 
53. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1605. See also 
Tobias, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 366 (affording examples in Fourth Circuit). 
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Executive Order 12, 778 issued in 1991, effectively suspended the 
efforts of judges, districts, local rules committees, and circuit judicial 
councils that might have treated local procedural proliferation. 
2. Federal Civil Justice Reform 
a. Congressional Civil Justice Reform 
Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 out of 
growing concern over increasing cost and delay in civil litigation.54 
The legislation required that all ninety-four districts adopt civil jus-
tice expense and delay reduction plans. These plans could indude 
eleven statutorily-prescribed procedures-principally relating to 
judicial case management, discovery, and alternatives to dispute 
resolution ("ADR")-and any other measures that would decrease cost 
or delay. 55 The CJRA also created circuit review committees to 
monitor district court implementation and assigned the Judicial 
Conference similar responsibility. 56 
The legislation implicitly encouraged courts to adopt proce-
dures that conflict with the Federal Rules, provisions in the United 
States Code, and requirements in other districts. 57 Most of the courts 
prescribed permutations of the eleven statutorily-enumerated meas-
ures, and numerous courts promulgated other procedures pursuant to 
a twelfth, open-ended provision. For instance, a number of districts 
relied on the eleven listed prescriptions to adopt local procedures 
which implemented automatic, or mandatory pre-discovery, 
disclosure, a controversial, nontraditional discovery technique. 58 
54. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1988 & Supp. 1993). I rely substantially in this subsection on 
Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1601-04. 
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1988 & Supp. 1993). All districts were to adopt plans by 
December 1, 1993, and to experiment with procedures for three years. See Notes on 
Implementation of Plans accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 474 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Tobias, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. at 1406-11 (cited in 
note 13). 
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1988 & Supp. 1993). See generally Lauren K Rebel, Fractured 
Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1447 (1994). The Rules 
Enabling Act states that local rules must be "consistent with Acts of Congress" and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
58. See, for example, United States District and Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Idaho, Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 10-11 (Dec. 1, 1991); United States District Court for 
the Eastorn District of New York, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 4-5 (Dec. 17, 
1991). 
712 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:699 
This experimentation with disclosure became particularly 
problematic because the national rule revisors were simultaneously 
considering an amendment to Federal Rule 26 that would have im-
posed disclosure nationwide.59 The revision entities ultimately 
adopted a Federal Rule amendment that was intended to accommo-
date CJRA experimentation with disclosure by permitting all ninety-
four districts to vary the provision or to reject it.60 Because Congress 
failed at the eleventh hour to delete the Rule 26 amendment 
prescribing disclosure, and because numerous districts apparently 
failed to plan for other contingencies, considerable confusion arose. 61 
Districts eventually adopted a broad array of disclosure procedures 
and a number of courts eschewed disclosure; these developments have 
increased inconsistency, cost, and delay.62 
The Eastern District of Texas most boldly and clearly asserted 
district court authority to adopt inconsistent local procedures when it 
declared that, insofar as the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
inconsistent with [the Court's] Plan, the Plan has precedence and is 
controlling."63 The district imposed a maximum fee schedule for con-
tingent fee cases not governed by fee-shifting legislation, although the 
Supreme Court has specifically proclaimed that Congress, not the 
judiciary, is to allocate the costs oflitigation.64 
The difficulties created by the adoption of a broad range of 
disparate procedures in the ninety-four districts have been com-
pounded by inconsistent judicial construction of the provisions and by 
the refusal of a number of judges to apply some measures which their 
courts have adopted. 65 Attorneys and parties have also experienced 
59. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, 137 F.R.D. at 87-88 (cited in note 43). 
See also Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1611 (cited in note 2) (discussing the circumstances sur-
rounding the Advisory Committee's preliminary draft prescribing automatic disclosure). 
60. 1993 Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 431 (cited in note 30). See also Tobias, 46 Stan. L. 
Rev. at 1612 (suggesting that the Advisory Committee changed its position te accommodate 
efforts proceeding under the c.JRA). 
61. Tohias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1612-14. 
62. Id. at 1614-15. 
63. See United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Civil Justice 
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 9 (Dec. 20, 1991). 
64. Id. at 7-8. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 
834-35 (1990) (concluding that the "allocation of the costs accruing from litigation is a matter for 
the legislature, not the courts''); Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. The Wilderness Society, 
421 U.S. 240, 247, 262, 271 (1975) (stating that distribution of litigation costs and attorney's fees 
is for Congress rather than for courts). 
65. Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1621 (cited in note 2). 
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considerable difficulty locating, understanding, and complying with 
the applicable local requirements. 66 
The increasingly complex and disuniform state of federal civil 
procedure has increased the expense and delay of federal civil litiga-
tion. All parties, but particularly those with limited resources and 
those who participate in litigation in multiple districts, have experi-
enced cost and delay.67 
These developments also show how the 1990 CJRA's imple-
mentation essentially suspended those features of the 1988 JIA which 
were intended to address local procedural proliferation.68 For in-
stance, circuit judicial councils may well have been reluctant to scru-
tinize, much less abolish, inconsistent local procedures that the 1990 
statute apparently authorized.69 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit Judicial 
Council suspended its review of local rules pending guidance from 
Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law on whether the CJRA 
took precedence over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 70 
b. Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform 
The Administration of President George Bush briefly experi-
mented with civil justice reform in the executive branch. 71 The 
President issued Executive Order 12, 778 on October 23, 1991, and the 
order took effect in January 1992. 72 During that month, the United 
States Justice Department promulgated preliminary guidelines to 
help federal administrative agencies and government attorneys im-
plement the executive order, and in January 1993 the department 
66. Id. See also Tobias, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. at 1422-25 (cited in note 13) (discussing the 
implications of "increased balkanization" and of locating, understanding, and complying with 
local requirements for the participants in federal civil litigation). 
67. See Tobias, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. at 1422-23; Tobias, 37 Buff. L. Rev. at 495-98 (cited in 
note 35) (discussing particular problems for litigants with limited resources, such as numerous 
civil rights plaintiffs). 
68. See notes 27-29, 52-53 and accompanying text. 
69. The c.JRA also created analogous entities, circuit review committees, and assigned 
them similar oversight responsibilities. See note 56 and accompanying text. 
70. See United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of the 
Judicial Council 4-5 (May 4, 1994). See also Tobias, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 365-66 (cited iu 
note 52) (describing implementation in the Fourth Circuit). 
71. I rely substantially in this subsection on Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice 
Reform, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1521 (1993). 
72. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 10, 3 C.F.R. 359, 367 (1991) (stating that order is effec-
tive 90 days after signing). 
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finalized the guidelines. 73 The order and the accompanying guidelines 
include numerous expense- and delay-reduction procedures that apply 
to the government when it participates in federal civil litigation; those 
strictures which are most relevant to the issues considered in this 
Essay will be examined. 
Section l(a) of Executive Order 12, 778 requires attorneys for 
the government to undertake reasonable efforts to notify potential 
defendants of the government's intent to file suit while affording the 
persons an opportunity to settle the dispute.74 The timing and content 
of reasonable efforts must be tailored to the circumstances of individ-
ual cases, and government counsel need not provide notice in unusual 
instances, such as situations when notice would tactically disadvan-
tage the United States.15 
Section l(d)(4) of the Executive Order covers the disclosure of 
core information. 76 This subsection requires that government lawyers 
offer to engage in the mutual exchange of certain significant informa-
tion early in civil suits.77 Attorneys can only make these offers when 
no dispositive motions are pending, when other litigants agree to 
exchange similar material, and when the court will enter the agree-
ment as a stipulated order.78 
73. Memorandum of Preliminary Guidance on Implementation of the Litigation Reforms of 
Executive Order No. 12,778, 57 Fed. Reg. 3640 (1992) ("Preliminary Memorandum"); 
Memorandum of Guidance on Implementation of the Reforms of Executive Order No. 12, 778, 58 
Fed. Reg. 6015 (1993) ("Memorandum"). The Department of Justice only issued this 
memorandum on January 25, 1993, five days after the inauguration of William Jefferson 
Clinton as the forty-second President of the United States. Id. at 6015. 
74. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(a), 3 C.F.R. at 360 (cited in note 72). See also 
Preliminary Memorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641 (stating that notice may be provided either by 
agency or litigating counsel for purpose of settling dispute). 
75. See Preliminary Memorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641 (stating that notice is not needed 
when it would defeat purpose of litigation); Memorandum, 58 Fed. Reg. at 6016 (cited in note 
73) (noting that agency efforts to resolve disputes prior to litigation can afford requisite notice 
and stating that government counsel need not repeat notice unless additional notice would be 
productive). 
76. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(l), 3 C.F.R. at 361 (cited in note 72) (noting that 
"core information" includes names and addresses of people having relevant information and 
location of relevant documents); Preliminary Memorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641-42 (discussing 
§ l(d)(l) of order, which requires government counsel to make reasonable efforts to reach 
agreement with opposing parties regarding exchange of information). 
77. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(l), 3 C.F.R. at 361. See Preliminary Memorandum, 57 
Fed. Reg. at 3641-42 (discussing requirement that government attorneys must offer to exchange 
certain information at early stage of litigation). 
78. Preliminary Memorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641-42. See also Memorandum, 58 Fed. 
Reg. at 6017 (cited in note 73) (suggesting that agreement between parties, unless local practice 
warrants otherwise, should be by consent order to guarantee court enforcement). 
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Section l(e) of the Executive Order mandates that government 
counsel introduce only dependable expert testimony.79 The attorneys 
must rely on experts who have specialized knowledge, who have per-
formed research, or who have other expertise in the applicable field 
and have premised their decisions on explanatory theories which are 
accepted by at least a substantial minority of experts in the area. so 
Section l(h) requires that government counsel offer to enter 
agreements with their opposition, prescribing two-way fee-shifting to 
the extent permitted by applicable law.81 Because the Attorney 
General's review of relevant authority indicated that no legislation 
specifically authorized such agreements,82 the Justice Department 
instructed government lawyers that they should not offer to enter 
these agreements until Congress enacts legislation or the Attorney 
General affords the requisite authority.83 
Several factors complicate efforts to ascertain precisely how 
executive branch civil justice reform has been implemented. First, 
the Bush Administration did not fully effectuate the reforms adopted 
because the Justice Department only finalized its guidelines in the 
Administration's waning days.84 Second, the Clinton Administration 
has left the Executive Order in effect and has made no affirmative 
79. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62 (cited in note 72). See also 
Preliminary Memorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3642-43 (noting that existing widely used practice 
among government attorneys to employ only reliable experts enhances government's position in 
litigation). 
80. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62 (describing proper use of expert 
testimony, defining reliable expert testimony, and requiring litigation counsel to engage in 
mutual disclosure of expert witness information to extent other party agrees to comparable 
disclosure). 
81. See Exec. Order No. 12, 778, § l(h), 3 C.F.R. at 362-63 (requiring that in civil litigation 
involving disputes over federal contracts pursuant to 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 or in any civil litiga-
tion initiated by United States, litigation counsel shall offer to enter agreement whereby losing 
party pays prevailing party's legal fees and costs); Preliminary Memorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 
3643 (cited in note 73) (noting that order directs Attorney General to review legal basis for fee-
shifting agreements). 
82. See Preliminary Memorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3643 (observing absence of legislative 
authority for fee-shifting agreements). 
83. Id. at 3643. The department correctly resolved this issue. The Supreme Court re-
cently declared that the "allocation of the costs accruing from litigation is a matter for the 
legislature, not the courts." Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 835. Moreover, Congress has 
expressly rejected two-way fee-shifting while passing nearly 200 statutes prescn"bing one-way 
fee-shifting. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (appendix to opinion of Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
84. See note 73 and accompanying text. 
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decision respecting the reform,85 although a Justice Department Task 
Force on Civil Justice Reform has been studying, and will soon issue 
recommendations regarding the administration's position on, civil 
justice reform. 86 
It is possible, nonetheless, to afford some rather generalized 
insight into the implementation of executive branch civil justice re-
form. 87 Because government lawyers have undertaken only limited 
effectuation of the Executive Order and the Justice Department 
guidelines, the efforts thus far may be characterized as somewhat 
sporadic. 88 Although individual lawyers have varied in the rigor and 
seriousness with which they have implemented the reform, there has 
been more, albeit limited, compliance within the Justice Department 
than among federal agencies or United States Attorneys' offices.89 
Experimentation with the different facets of executive branch reform 
has also been variable. For example, government lawyers have effec-
tuated more comprehensively the aspects of the order that resemble 
federal procedural rules.90 Government attorneys have correspond-
ingly implemented ADR less broadly because of lingering concerns 
over how best to effectuate the alternatives. 91 
The checkered status of implementation of executive branch 
civil justice reform has had detrimental effects similar to those 
resulting from civil justice reform pursuant to the CJRA. For 
instance, the possibility that additional procedural requirements 
might apply in civil cases involving the government further 
complicates federal civil procedure by requiring that parties fmd, 
master, and conform to those requirements. Insofar as the executive 
branch strictures apply, they increase complexity, disuniformity, 
expense, and delay and may thwart efforts to limit local procedural 
proliferation. 92 
85. This is premised on conversations with numerous individuals, principally lawyers who 
work in the Department of Justice and in Congress, who are familiar with the administration's 
civiljustice reform efforts. 
86. Seeid. 
87. Seeid. 
88. I rely substantially in the remainder of this paragraph on Tobias, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at 
1538-39 (cited in note 71). 
89. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, Director of Torts Branch, Civil Division, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 1993). 
90. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, Special Counsel to the Assistant 
Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 1993). 
91. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad (cited in note 89). 
92. In these ways, executive branch reform resembles reform under the c.JRA. See notes 
54-70 and accompanying text. The Bush Administration also proposed civil justice reform 
legislation that included numerous provisions that were similar to those in Executive Order 
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3. AN ote on State Procedures and State Civil Justice Reform 
Many of the above ideas regarding federal procedural revision 
processes and federal civil justice reform may have applicability to 
analogous processes and reforms in the states. For instance, a num-
ber of state court systems have modelled their civil procedure rules on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have premised their rule 
amendment schemes on the federal system. 9a 
Many jurisdictions have correspondingly participated in some 
form of civil justice reform. 94 Numerous states have created "futures 
commissions" to plan for their courts and civil litigation, 95 while most 
jurisdictions have experimented with a broad range of procedures for 
expediting cases and reducing litigation costs. 96 These procedural 
revision processes and reforms are accorded little additional treat-
ment in this Essay because they are less relevant than the federal 
processes and reforms to the CSLRA and to the issues treated here 
and because they vary significantly.91 
12, 778. See Access to Justice Act of 1992, S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 3, 1992). See also 
Tobias, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1540-41 (cited in note 71) (analyzing S. 2180). 
93. See generally John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2059 (1989) (discussing 
the advantages of having state rules which conform to the Federal Rules). See also John B. 
Oakley and Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Suruey of State Court Systems 
of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367, 1377-78 (1986) (same); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 2237, 2237 (1989) (stating that "within almost every state, a procedure based on the 
Federal Rules governs most types of civil litigation"); Subrin, 67 A.B.A. J. at 1650 (cited in note 
7) (discussing the fact that proponents of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 argued that the uni-
form Federal Rules would be a model adopted by the states). 
94. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and 
Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1553 (1994). 
95. See generally Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Reinventing Justice 2022: 
Report of the Chief Justice's Commission on the Future of the Courts (1992). See also Ira Pilchen 
and Sandra Retcliff, American Judicature Society, The Future and the Courts: Conducting State 
Court Futures Activities (A.J.S., 1993); James A. Dator and Sharon J. Rodgers, State Justice 
Institute and American Judicature Society, Alternative Futures for the State Courts of 2020 
(A.J.S., 1991). 
96. States have conducted much of this experimentation in the broad areas of case man-
agement, discovery, and alternative dispute resolution. See Sherman, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1556-
87 (cited in note 94). The state experimentation thus resembles federal civil justice reform, but 
numerous states commenced their efforts earlier than the federal endeavors. See notes 54-92 
and accompanying text; Sherman, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1556-60 (discussing certain differences 
between federal and state court civiljustice reform efforts). 
97. For a striking example of a provision in the new legislation which substantially in-
trudes on state procedural prerogatives, see notes 170, 174, 178 and accompanying text. The 
material below on substantive reforms alludes to certain aspects of the processes and reforms. 
See notes 99-117, 154-79 and accompanying text. For more treatment of state civil justice 
reform, see generally Sherman, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1553. Finally, it is important to remember 
that, insofar as the civil procedures applied in federal and state courts within specific states 
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B. Substantive Reforms 
1. Products Liability 
The articulation of, and change in, substantive products liabil-
ity law has traditionally been the province of the states.98 State su-
preme courts have assumed primary responsibility for creating and 
modifying products liability doctrine, principally through common law 
development.99 The American Law Institute's issuance of the 
Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 402A in 1965 profoundly influ-
enced the direction of products liability law, and Section 402A's for-
mulation of the strict liability base for products liability literally 
swept the nation.100 More than forty states have subscribed to the 
Restatement articulation or to the common law enunciation of strict 
liability that the California Supreme Court formulated in Greenman 
v. Yuba Power Products.101 Numerous state legislatures have adopted 
statutes which codify or change certain features of the Restatement 
differ, this phenomenon additionally complicates the efforts of practitioners in those states to 
practice in both court systems. See Subrin, 67 AB.A J. at 1650 (cited in note 7); Oakley and 
Coon, 61 Wash. L. Rev. at 1377-78 (cited in note 93). 
98. Efforts that have been undertaken to convince Congress to pass federal products 
liability legislation deserve only limited treatment in this essay as they have somewhat less 
relevance te the issues treated here. For more than a decade, members of Congress have 
introduced a number of federal product liability bills, although none has passed. See, for 
example, Product Liability Reform Act, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 31, 1993) (noting that 
product liability has traditionally been left to states); 138 Cong. Rec. S13145 (Sept. 10, 1992) 
(statement of Senator Kasten) (noting that a number of Senators had been working for years on 
product liability reform); David G. Savage, Senate Defeats Federal Product Liability Law 
Legislation, L.A Times DI (Sept. 11, 1992). The proposals have addressed a broad range of 
issues relating to products liability. The most important provisions govern the basis for 
imposing liability, but additional significant aspects cover statutes of limitation and repose, 
proof, defenses, and punitive damages, among others. See, for example, Product Liability 
Reform Act, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 31, 1993) (seeking to create uniform national 
standards of product liability law governing such issues as product seller liability, awards of 
punitive damages, and time limits for liability). See also Product Liability Reform Act, Report of 
the Senate Commerce Committee on S. 687, S. Rep. No. 103-203, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20-58 
(Nov. 20, 1993) (providing summary of major provisions of S. 687 as well as a section-by-section 
analysis of the bill's major provisions); note 102 and accompanying text (discussing state 
legislative reforms). 
99. I rely substantially here on William Prosser and W. Page Keeton, The Law of Torts 
677-724 (West, 5th ed. 1984). See generally Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The 
Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1995). 
100. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); Prosser and Keeton, The Law of 
Torts at 694 (asserting that § 402A swept the country). 
101. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). Alaska is one jurisdiction that follows Greenman. 
See Clary v. 5th Avenue Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244, 247-48 (Alaska 1969); Shanks v. Upjohn, 
835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992). 
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formulation or which modify various aspects of the case law doctrine 
of strict products liability.102 
The strict liability base of products liability has been contro-
versial. Some courts and a few writers have found the strict manner 
in which liability has been imposed for product defects too inflex-
ible.103 Manufacturers and other potential defendants have asserted 
that strict liability unfairly exposes them to excessive liability, sub-
stantially raises the cost of insurance, and complicates efforts to de-
sign, manufacture, advertise, and sell products.104 
The American Law Institute recently decided to draft a 
Restatement Third of Torts governing products liability.105 The ALI 
commissioned Professor James Henderson and Professor Aaron 
Twerski to serve as reporters for the project.106 The reporters, work-
ing with a group of advisors, completed a draft, which the Institute 
considered at its annual meeting in May 1994.1°7 
The draft tendered proved to be controversial for several rea-
sons. A number of observers contended that the proposed language of 
the Restatement limited too sharply the strict liability base and pos-
sibly returned products liability law to negligence in several re-
spects.108 Concomitant criticisms were that certain phrasing of the 
102. See, for example, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-1-719, 720 (1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:58C-
1 to C-5 (West, 1987). See generally John W. Wade, Victor E. Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly, and 
David F. Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases and Materials on Torts 807-08 
(Foundation, 9th ed. 1994). 
103. See, for example, Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W. 2d 176, 185-86 
(1984) (adopting negligence based risk-utility test in product liability actions predicated on 
design defects); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991) (holding that sellers of 
certain unavoidably unsafe products should not be held strictly liable for "unfortunate conse-
quences arising from their use"); Sheila Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From 
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 644-49 (1980) 
(criticizing application of strict liability standard te design defect claims); James Henderson and 
Aaron Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 
65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 271-89 (1990) (arguing that negligence should emerge as prevailing 
theory in failure te warn cases). 
104. See, for example, Peter Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 
3-10 (Basic Books, 1988) (cataloging costs associated with current product liability "tax"); W. Kip 
VIScusi, Reforming Products Liability 14-41 (Harvard U., 1991) (outlining diniensions ofliability 
crisis). See also Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement 
(Third), 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1357, 1360 (1994). 
105. See Restatement (Third) of the Law, Torts: Products Liablity, Tentative Draft No. 1 
(April 12, 1994) ("Tentative Draft No. 1"). 
106. See Henry J. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, 78 AB.A J. 18, 18 (Aug. 1992). 
See generally James A Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512 (1992). 
107. See Tentative Draft No. 1 (cited in note 105). 
108. See, for example, Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The 
ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 688-91 (1995); Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products 
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provision and some of its accompanying commentary failed to restate 
the law, which currently provides for strict liability.109 After rather 
contentious floor debate, the ALI membership agreed in principle that 
the reporters should continue in the general direction that they were 
proceeding and that the entire body would reconsider the draft at its 
May 1995 annual meeting. no 
2. Fee-Shifting 
Although fee-shifting may be characterized as substantive or 
procedural, it warrants brief examination here. Fee-shifting has tra-
ditionally been governed by the American Rule which, absent statute 
or contract, requires each party to pay its own attorney's fees.111 
Congress has generally left fee-shifting to the states, although it has 
passed approximately two hundred statutes which provide for fee-
shifting, almost exclusively in federal question cases.112 Most of this 
legislation prescribes fee shifts to encourage the pursuit of certain 
forms of litigation which vindicate important social policies. For 
instance, Congress has inserted fee-shifting provisions in civil rights 
statutes to facilitate litigation by individuals and groups who have 
suffered discrimination and to deter those who might discriminate 
from doing so. Congress has similarly prescribed fee-shifting in 
Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter 
Process, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1361, 1362-63 (1993). See also Jerry Phillips, The Proposed Products 
Liability Restatement: A Misguided Revision, 10 Touro L. Rev. 151, 181 (1993). 
109. See, for example, Larry S. Stewart, The American Law Institute and Products 
Liability: "Restatement or Refonn"?, Trial 29-30 (Sept. 1994); Telephone Interview with Gerald 
F. Tietz, Professor of Law, Temple University and ALI memher (March 23, 1995). See generally 
Reland F. Banks and Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second), Section 402A-
Design Defect, 72 Or. L. Rev. 411 (1993) (arguing that draft of § 402A fails to reflect existing 
law). See also Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1265, 1265 (1994) (asserting 
that the two reporters' writings over the last two decades indicate "conservative penchant 
toward negligence and manufacturer-protective rules"). 
110. See ALI Hesitates On Lawyer Liability, Product Liability Restatement Efforts, 62 
U.S.L.W. 2734, 2735-36 (1994); Stewart, Trial at 29-30. See also Restatement (Third) of the 
Law, Torts: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No. 2 (March 13, 1995). 
111. See, for example, Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257 (noting general rule that litigants 
pay their own attorney's fees); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1973) (discussing circumstances 
under which fee-shifting may occur, notwithstanding American Rule of disfavoring award of 
attorney's fees). See also John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney 
Fee Recovery, L. & Contemp. Probs. 9, 13-27 (Winter 1984) (tracing development of American 
Rule). See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
Person's Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567 (1993) (discussing exceptions to the American 
Rule). 
112. See note 83; Varge, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1587-89 (noting that, notwithstanding the 
American Rule, a large number of federal and state statutes provide for fee-shifting). 
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natural resources legislation to facilitate environmental cleanup or to 
prevent pollution. us 
Proposals which would require losing parties to pay their op-
ponents' legal fees are grounded on the above concerns, such as the 
litigation explosion, litigation abuse, and manufacturers' substantial 
exposure in products liability cases, u4 as well as arguable concerns 
involving fairness and increased litigation expenses. An example is 
the provision for fee-shifting that the Bush Administration included -
in its legislative proposal for civil justice reform. us The proposal was 
premised on the recommendations of the Council on Competitiveness 
Working Group on Civil Justice Reform and appeared in that entity's 
August 1991 report.us The fee-shifting provision would have entitled 
the prevailing litigant to recover attorney's fees "only to the extent 
that such party prevailed on any position or claim advanced during 
the action."117 
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON SENSE LEGAL REFORMS Ac:r 
This section selectively analyzes the reform proposals that the 
sponsors of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act have included in 
the legislation. I descriptively evaluate the provisions, attempt to 
provide the reasons for their inclusion in the CSLRA, and critically 
assess their requirements, particularly in terms of potential effects on 
ongoing procedural and substantive reforms. 
A. Rule 11 
Section 104(B) of the CSLRA, which passed the House of 
Representatives as Section 4 of the Attorney Accountability Act 
("A.AN') on March 7, 1995, would modify the 1993 amendment of Rule 
11 in several important ways.us Section 104(B) of the CSLRA would 
113. See, for example, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(1988) (allowing prevailing party to claim attorney's fees); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1988) (allowing for reasonable attorney's fees where appropriate). See also 
Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 313·17 (cited in note 3); Vargo, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1587·89. 
114. See notes 11·12, 14-16, 104 and accompanying text. · 
115. S. 2180 § 3 (cited in note 92). See also notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
116. President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America 
15-27 (G.P.O., 1991). 
117. S. 2180 § 3 (cited in note 92). 
118. H.R. 10 § 104(B) (cited in note 1); H.R. 988, § 4 (cited in note 1). See also note 120 and 
accompanying text (describing two important additions included in H.R. 988). 
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have made judicial imposition of sanctions mandatory, rather than 
discretionary, thereby reverting to the 1983 formulation, and would 
have expressly provided that the sanctions for rule violations, in 
addition to being "sufficient to deter," would be adequate to 
"compensate the parties that were injured."119 Section 4 of the AAA 
retains those requirements and would eliminate the provision in Rule 
ll's 1993 amendment for safe harbors-which requires that targets 
have notice of their alleged violations and twenty-one days to modify 
or withdraw them-and would specifically make Rule 11 applicable to 
discovery.120 
Several arguments support the changes that Section 104(B) 
and Section 4 would institute.121 First, the alterations would have 
greater deterrent effect on those who might be tempted to contravene 
Rule 11. Second, the modifications will afford increased incentives for 
parties injured by Rule violations to invoke the provision. 
Numerous complications attend the proposals to change the 
1993 revision of Rule 11 by eliminating safe harbors, making the pro-
vision applicable to discovery, and making sanctioning compulsory 
and compensatory. The legislation would reinstitute the most 
problematic features of the 1983 amendment of Rule 11-the very 
aspects that the national rule revisors intended the 1993 revision to 
ameliorate. These include the incentives to invoke Rule 11 for 
compensatory and tactical objectives, which can lead to unnecessary, 
expensive satellite litigation and which can chill the enthusiasm of 
certain parties, especially resource-poor litigants.122 Adoption of the 
changes could revive additional detrimental dimensions of the 1983 
revision: the provision's threat and retreat aspect, its tendency to try 
lawyers rather than cases, and the increased incivility that 
necessarily attended the 1983 amendment's invocation.123 These 
119. H.R. -IO § 104(B}. See also 1983 amendment to F.R.C.P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 
197 (making mandatory judicial imposition of sanctions). 
120. See H.R. 988, § 4 (cited in note l); note 51 and accompanying text (describing relevant 
aspects of Rule ll's 1993 amendment). 
121. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Dissenting Statement, 146 F.R.D. at 507-10 
(cited in note 50); Floor Debate on H.R. 988, 141 Cong. Rec. H2663, H2664, H2675 (March 6, 
1995) (WL 89571) (statements of Reps. Moorhead and Goodlate); Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary 
(testimony of Debra Ballen, Senior Vice President, American Insurance Association) (Feb. 6, 
1995). See also Duncan, 81 AB.A. J. at 12 (cited in note 51) (discussing decline of sanctions 
litigation due to the 1993 amendment of Rule 11). 
122. See notos 32-41 and accompanying text. 
123. See Tobias, 77 Iowa L. Rev. at 1785 (cited in note 36) (asserting all three propositions); 
Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit 20·21 (April 
1991) (asserting idea regarding Rule 11 and civility). 
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difficulties would adversely affect parties, attorneys, and judges in 
individual cases and the civiljustice system as a whole. 
As damaging as the above complications might be, 
congressional passage of the legislation could have even more devas-
tating impacts on the national rule revision process.124 The 1993 
amendment of Rule 11 resulted from a process in which the national 
revision entities clearly identified a problem, carefully studied the 
difficulty, drafted a proposal for change, solicited and considered 
much public input, and laboriously drafted several additional propos-
als that the revisors believed were responsive to public comment and 
represented the fairest, clearest amendment which could be devel-
oped. The revision eventually promulgated constituted the best effort 
of the various committees and their expert advisors to treat equitably 
all of the interests that the amendment would affect and to adopt a 
workable compromise. The procedure that the rule revision entities 
employed-inviting public scrutiny, fully considering public input, 
and rewriting proposed changes in light of those sugges-
tions-constituted the type of open, reasoned decisional process that 
Congress envisioned in enacting the 1988 JIA. 
Congressional reversal of four critical, well-considered features 
of the improved Rule 11 within two years of the amendment's prom-
ulgation and before it has even had an opportunity to work would be 
unfortunate, inadvisable, and deleterious for several reasons. 
Legislative reversal would directly contravene one of the JIA's major 
purposes, restoration of the primacy of the national rule revision 
process.125 Fundamental, peremptory congressional change in such 
essential provisions of such a controversial rule following so closely 
upon the conclusion of herculean efforts to improve the provision 
could deal a crippling blow to the cause of national rule revision, 
additionally wounding that process at a time of great vulnerability126 
124. I rely substantially in this paragraph on notes 25-26, 30-31, 43-51, and accompanying 
text. 
125. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Legislative reversal would concomitantly 
complicate federal civil litigation even more by requiring that attorneys closely monitor con-
gressional legislation affecting procedure and learn about, understand, and comply with major 
changes in a controversial Federal Rule less than two years after its substantial revision. 
126. Some observers and I believe that the national rule revisors' decision to include an 
opt-out provision in the disclosure amendment was a self-inflicted wound that seriously 
undermined national uniformity and simplicity. See, for example, Lauren K Robel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 Rev. Litig. 49, 51, 
61 (1994) (arguing for more cautions by Advisory Committee and for nationally uniform 
discovery rules). See generally Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 
F.R.D. 139 (1993). 
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and demoralizing many who participated in the 1993 rules amend-
ment process. 
Passage of the legislation would also extend the unwise, dis-
ruptive practice of congressional intervention in the rule revision 
process.127 Indeed, the American Bar Association House of Delegates 
adopted a resolution admonishing Congress to reject the proposed 
modifications in Rule 11 because "changes in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure ... should be left to the existing rulemaking bod-
ies."128 Enactment of the legislation would correspondingly extend the 
inadvisable practice of overly frequent congressional intervention in 
procedural policymaking, which passage of the 1988 and 1990 stat-
utes epitomized.129 
B. Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Title II of the CSLRA, which passed in the House of 
Representatives as the Securities Litigation Reform Act ("SLRA.'') on 
March 8, 1995, would change securities litigation in a number of 
significant ways.130 The components of the proposed legislation which 
are most relevant to the issues treated in this Essay are the 
127. See notes 22-24, 59-62, and accompanying text. 
128. See Brad Bole, Congress Again Takes Up "Legal Reform", Litigation News 1, 6 (Feb.-
March 1995); Telephone Interview with Brad Bole, Echevarria Law Firm, Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 27, 
1995). 
129. See Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1599-1604 (cited in note 2) (discussing the 1988 
Judicial Improvements Act and the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act); notes 25-29, 54-70, and 
accompanying text (same). Section 104 of the CSLRA also includes a subsection titled "Truth in 
Attorneys' Fees." H.R. 10 § 104(a) (cited in note 1). That subsection provides that it is the 
"sense of the Congress that each state should require" all practicing attorneys who are being 
paid on a contingency fee basis to disclose to their clients the actual services performed and the 
exact number of hours worked. H.R. 10 § 104(a)(l)-(2). The ostensible purpose of these re-
quirements is to make lawyers more accountable to their clients. The strictures would probably 
be expensive and difficult to enforce, while they may interfere with the attorney-client relation-
ship. The final concern apparently led the ABA Litigation Section to oppose the concepts. See 
Bole, Litigation News at 6 (noting that there was strong opposition to the disclosure policy 
expressed at the Wmter Council/Committee Chairs Meeting). The requirements, therefore, 
might complicate the efforts of certain potential plaintiffs, such as resource-poor individuals 
who have suffered personal injuries, to secure counsel, and may restrict federal court access. 
The subsection might also have some effect on experimentation involving contingency fees 
under the CJRA. See note 64 and accompanying text. These proposed requirements would not 
interfere with state prerogatives because the legislation would appropriately defer to the states 
in adopting and implementing the strictures. The House did not include this subsection in H.R. 
988 as it passed. See notes 142-47, 154-62, and accompanying text (discussing additional provi-
sions included in H.R. 988). 
130. See H.R. 10 §§ 201-08; H.R. 1058 (cited in note 1). For a sense of the debate in legal 
academia over the validity of securities litigation, see generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Why 
Disimply?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (1995); Joel Seligman, The Merits Still Matter: A Rejoinder to 
Professor Grundfest's Comment, Why Disimply?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1995). 
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imposition of special pleading and class action strictures in securities 
cases and the requirement that losing litigants pay prevailing parties' 
attorneys' fees in certain lawsuits. The changes are apparently in-
tended to limit the amount of securities litigation, particularly the 
cases that are lawyer-driven or that are brought to extract settle-
ments. 
Section 204 of the CSLRA and Section 4 of the SLRA would 
place on plaintiffs specialized pleading requirements relating to scien-
ter in actions brought under Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.131 Mandating more rigorous pleading could discourage 
plaintiffs from pursuing fraud claims and erode somewhat the stat-
ute's purposes. The imposition of particularized pleading may conflict 
with the general notice pleading regime of the Federal Rules, which 
the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, and undermines the Rules' 
trans-substantive character.132 
Section 202 of the CSLRA would have required the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem or a plaintiff steering committee in secu-
rities class actions to prevent ''lawyer-driven litigation,"133 while Sec-
tion 2 of the SLRA retains plaintiff steering committees.134 Section 
203 of the CSLRA proposed additional strictures, such as the re-
quirements that named plaintiffs have "meaningful investment[s]" in 
class suits and that plaintiffs file no more than five actions during 
any three-year period to prevent "abusive practices that foment litiga-
tion,"135 and Section 3 of the SLRA retains the numerical prohibition 
on litigation.136 These strictures could have certain disadvantages 
similar to those that specialized pleading entails. If enacted, the 
requirements may dissuade potential plaintiffs from bringing actions 
131. H.R. 10 § 204; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq (1988 & 
Supp. 1993). 
132. See Leathennan v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113 
S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (stating that courts may not require a "heightened pleading standard''); 
Carl Tobias, The Transfonnation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1501 (1992) 
(discussing trans-substantivity); Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 296-301 (cited in note 3) 
(discussing notice pleading regime). Federal Rule 9(b), which geverns the pleading of fraud or 
mistake, is the only provision in the federal rules that requires specialized pleading, but the 
SLRA would impose more stringent pleading requirements. See generally Marcus, 86 Colum. L. 
Rev. at 447-48 (cited in note 6). 
133. H.R. 10 § 202 (cited in note 1). 
134. Section 2 does not include the guardian ad !item requirement. See H.R. 1058, § 2 
(cited in note 1). 
135. H.R. 10 § 203 (cited in note 1). 
136. Section 3 does not include the meaningful investments requirement. See H.R. 1058 § 
3 (cited in note 1). See also Pamela Coyle, When Bigger Isn't Better, AB.A J. 66, 72 (March 
1995). 
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and undercut the Securities Act's objectives while eroding the trans-
substantive nature of Federal Rule 23. 
The potentially corrosive effects on national rule revision ap-
pear more important, however. The adoption of special requirements 
governing class actions could disrupt or at least undermine the efforts 
of the Advisory Committee, its expert advisors, and the public-to 
study Rule 23 conscientiously, to draft carefully comprehensive 
changes in the class action device, and to circulate and seek comment 
on several drafts-which have been proceeding for most of this dec-
ade.131 
Section 3 of the SLRA could also make losing parties liable for 
the attorney's fees that their adversaries incur. This fee-shifting pro-
vision is intended to afford an additional means of preventing 
"abusive practices that foment litigation,''138 but it would probably 
discourage plaintiffs from pursuing actions that could vindicate the 
Securities Act's goals.139 
The imposition of numerous new requirements in securities 
litigation may restrict access to federal courts in other ways that are 
similar to those examined earlier. As with civil justice reform, law-
yers and parties will have to learn about, understand, and conform to 
the strictures, at the cost of scarce time and resources.140 As with the 
1983 amendment of Rule 11, the imposition of new requfrements will 
probably foster considerable expensive, unnecessary satellite litiga-
tion involving the strictures' meaning and application.141 
137. Since the early 1990s, the Advisory Committee has worked assiduously on a proposal 
that could comprehensively modify Federal Rule 23 governing class actions. See generally 
Rebert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 Rev. Litig. 79 (1994). 
See also id. at 109-12 (reproducing ci.trrent proposed amendment of Rule 23); id. at 80-81 
~ (recounting three-decade history of controversy involving Rule 23 and proposals for its reform). 
The committee has commissioned the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), an important research 
arm of the federal courts, to undertake a thorough study of the class action device. Telephone 
Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director and Principal Researcher on Class 
Action Study, FJC (Mar. 1, 1995). The committee has also developed several draft proposals of 
an amendment, has sought input on those proposals from knowledgeable experts, conducted a 
meeting devoted solely te Rule 23 in February 1995, and will probably publish a formal proposal 
in the next year. See Bone, 14 Rev. Litig. at 80 n.3. 
138. See H.R. 10 § 203 (cited in note 1); H.R. 1058 § 3 (cited in note 1). The fee-shifting 
provision in H.R. 10 is less flexible than the one in H.R. 1058, which requires that the judge 
determine that the losing party's position was not substantially justified, that imposing fees and 
expenses on the loser would be just, and that the cost of the fees and expenses to the prevailing 
party would he substantially burdensome or unjust. Of course, this phrasing could foster 
satellite litigation over its meaning. 
139. This provision, therefore, would have effects analogous to the strictures on securities 
litigation that were discussed above. See notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
140. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
141. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text. H.R. 1058 includes a number of provisions 
that were not in H.R. 10; however, they are less relevant to the issues treated in this Essay. 
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C. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
Section 102 of the CSLRA and Section 3 of the AAA would 
amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in ways that restrict expert 
testimony, ostensibly to increase "honesty in testimony."142 Section 
102 would make admissible a witness's opinion testimony when prem-
ised on scientific knowledge only if the court decides that the opinion 
is "(l) based on scientifically valid reasoning; and (2) sufficiently reli-
able so that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the dan-
gers specified in rule 403."143 Section 3 of the AAA retains the second 
clause, changes the first clause to "scientifically valid and reliable," 
and adds a new clause requiring that there be a ''valid scientific con-
nection to the fact it is offered to prove."144 
These requirements would probably complicate the efforts of 
plaintiffs in cases that require testimony on novel or complex 
scientific issues, such as products liability and environmental 
litigation, to find experts who will testify and to prove their cases. 
This could frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs in products liability and 
environmental cases to function as private attorneys-general145 and of 
certain environmental plaintiffs to vindicate important purposes of 
environmental statutes. The Supreme Court recently addressed 
issues involving expert testimony that are so closely related to those 
which the legislation implicates that the provision may merely be an 
attempt to overturn the Court's ruling.14s 
Perhaps most significant, congressional amendment of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 would conflict with an ongoing reform initiative. 
The suggested changes in Rule 702 seem perfectly appropriate for 
142. See H.R. IO § I02 (cited in note l); H.R. 988 § 3 (cited in note 1). 
143. See H.R. IO § I02. 
144. H.R. 988 § 3 (cited in note 1). See also note 138 (suggesting that phrasing would foster 
satellite litigation). 
145. Plaintiffs function as private attorneys-general by, for instance, filing litigation involv-
ing drugs or pollutants that the Food and Drug Administration or the Environmental Protection 
Agency choose not to regulate or regulate with insufficient rigor. See Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 
at 314-17 (cited in note 3) (discussing private attorneys-general in a civil rights context). See 
generally Bryant Garth, et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives 
From an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 353 (1988) (discussing 
private atterneys-general in a class action context). The phrasing employed in Section 3 of the 
AAA would also foster considerable satellite litigation over its meaning. 
146. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794, 2799 (1993) 
(holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide the standard for admitting expert scientific 
evidence in a federal trial). See generally Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of 
Frye, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1745-2294 (1994); Symposinm, The Impact of Science and Technology 
on the Courts, 43 Emory L. J. 867-1122 (1994). 
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treatment in the normal course of the rule revision process. Indeed, 
during the 1990s, the national revision entities considered amending 
Rule 702, while, in 1993, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure referred the proposed alteration of the 
provision to the newly-appointed Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Evidence.147 
Legislative revision of this evidentiary rule would seriously 
compromise the major purpose in recently constituting an Advisory 
Committee on Rules of Evidence148 and might undercut the committee 
before it has had an opportunity to prove whether it is worthwhile.149 
In fact, the American Bar Association, when opposing congressional 
amendment of Rule 702, emphasized that modification in the ''Federal 
Rules of Evidence should be left to the existing rulemaking bodies."150 
D. Notice Requirement 
Section 105 of the CSLRA would require that plaintiffs afford 
defendants actual notice "specifying the particular claims 
alleged ... and the amount of damages claimed" thirty days before 
plaintiffs could file certain federal civil suits.151 An important 
rationale for this stricture is that defendants who have such notice 
will be encouraged to settle cases prior to their filing. The ostensible 
purpose of the notice requirement, therefore, is to reduce the quantity 
of federal civil litigation. 
The thirty-day notice stricture would be unnecessary, ineffec-
tive, or detrimental in the overwhelming majority of situations in 
which plaintiffs contemplate civil suit. In those potential cases which 
are likely to settle because, for example, defendants have substantial 
exposure based on clear liability or significant damages, it is already 
good litigation practice for plaintiffs to notify defendants. For law-
14 7. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, 137 F.R.D. at 156 (cited in note 43); 
Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence, Excerpt from 
the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, reprinted in 
14 7 F.R.D. 275, 282 (1993) (stating that Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure "decided to refer the proposed amendment of Rule 702 to the new Advisory 
Committee''). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is 
Souud; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991). 
148. See note 22. 
149. See noto 14 7. 
150. ·See Bole, Litigation News at 6 (cited in note 128). The legislation !night also conflict 
with ongoing executive branch reform relating to the government's reliance on expert witnesses. 
See notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
151. H.R. 10 § 105 (cited in note 1). The notice provision is not included in the three bills 
that passed the House during the week of March 6, 1995. Brief treatment is warranted here 
because the Senate could revive notice and because executive branch reform includes it. 
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suits which will probably not settle, plaintiffs will have to participate 
in a fruitless, tfuie-consuming, and expensive gesture that will prove 
ineffective. In some instances, the notice may afford defendants cer-
tain tactical advantages, and in the worst cases it will provide defen-
dants thirty additional days in which to destroy potentially damaging 
evidence. 
The limited information that is available on a similar notice 
mechanism which has been experimented with under executive 
branch civil justice reform confirms most of the propositions above.152 
This material suggests that the notice measure has had limited effi-
cacy.153 Finally, the differences between the executive branch notice 
technique and the strictures in Section 105 of the CSLRA mean that 
the two reforms could create confusion, expense, and delay by impos-
ing inconsistent requirements in some civil cases. 
E. Fee-Shifting in Diversity Cases 
Section 101 of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act 
authorized judges to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing 
parties in diversity cases and to exercise their discretion not to award 
such fees or to reduce the amount when special circumstances make 
awards unjust.154 The Securities Litigation Reform Act retains 
somewhat similar pr,ovisions,155 while Section 2 of the Attorney 
Accountability Act replaces the fee-shifting requirement in section 
101 of the CSLRA with a settlement offer provision that would modify 
current Federal Rule 68 by prescribing fee-shifting in diversity 
cases.156 
152. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
153. This assertion is premised on conversations with a number of individuals wbo are 
familiar with executive branch civiljnstice reform. 
154. H.R. 10 § 101 (cited in note 1). 
155. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
156. H.R. 988 § 2 (cited in note 1). H.R. lO's fee-shifting provision is treated here because it 
would have effects that are somewhat similar te fee-shifting in the SLRA and te the settlement 
offer provision in the AAA. The Advisory Committee proposed an amendment te Rule 68 during 
1983 and 1984, but it withdrew that proposal in the face of strong opposition. See Tobias, 74 
Cornell L. Rev. at 310-19 (cited in note 3). 
Since the late 1980s, the Advisory Committeee has been informally considering an 
amendment te Rule 68; however, it has not officially published a proposed amendment. Judge 
William Schwarzer recently suggested an amendment in Rule 68 which prescribes fee-shifting, 
but that proposal includes more safeguards, such as exemptions for class actions, than the AAA 
provision does. See generally William W Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An 
Approach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76 Judicature 14 7 (1992). 
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Section 101 of the CSLRA provides that ''reasonable attorney's 
fees" are the "actual cost incurred by the nonprevailing party for an 
attorney's fee payable to an attorney in connection with [the] claim" or 
a ''reasonable cost that would have been incurred," had the party not 
signed a contingency fee agreement.157 One reason proffered for this 
proposal is that it is fairer to permit parties that prevail in diversity 
cases to seek recovery of attorney's fees. Another is that the 
possibility that losing litigants will have to pay their opponents' 
attorney's fees serves as a necessary deterrent to the pursuit of 
frivolous actions.15s 
The most important criticism of Section 101 of the Common 
Sense Legal Reforms Act is that it contradicts the premises, 
principally implicating court access, that underlie the longstanding 
American Rule. Indeed, the ABA's "longtime support for access to 
courts and [opposition to] across the board 'loser pays' without regard 
to subject matter" led the association to request that Congress reject 
Section 101.159 Section 2 of the Attorney Accountability Act would 
have similar, albeit somewhat less harsh, effects, even though the 
provision lacks certain safeguards that have attended other proposals 
to amend Rule 68.160 
The fee-shifting and settlement offer proposals might limit 
federal court access by engendering considerable unnecessary, 
expensive satellite litigation. For instance, under numerous other 
statutory schemes, questions regarding who is a prevailing party and 
what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees have fostered much 
satellite litigation, some of which has even reached the Supreme 
Court.161 Section 101 of the CSLRA and Section 2 of the AAA could 
also reduce access in cases that are close, complex, or difficult or 
expensive to prove, or in which potential plaintiffs have little power or 
157. H.R. 10 § 101 (cited in note 1). Section 2 of the MA includes similar language, which 
is equally susceptible to inconsistent interpretation and bas similar propensities to foster 
satellite litigation over its meaning. 
158. Similar ideas seem to support Section 2 of the AAA. It may he fairer to allow plaintiffs 
that "prevail" by exceeding the settlement offer at trial and defendants that prevail by limiting 
plaintiffs' recovery to less than the settlement offer at trial to seek attorney's fees, while the 
prospect of having to pay opponents' fees could deter the pursuit of frivolous claims or at least 
encourage settlements. 
15~. Bole, Litigation News at 6 (cited in note 128). 
160. It does have some safeguards, such as exemptions for claims seeking equitable relief. 
See H.R. 988 § 2 (cited in note 1); note 156 (discussing proposal with greater safeguards). 
161. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 
788-93 (1989) (discussing eligibility for fee award as prevailing party under Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fees Awards Act); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577-80 (1986) (defining 
reasonable attorney's fee under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act). See also note 51 and 
accompanying text. 
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money, because the exposure to liability for adversaries' attorney's 
fees will chill possible parties' enthusiasm for filing or vigorously 
pursuing litigation. Moreover, there is substantial difference between 
losing a close case on the merits and pursuing frivolous litigation. 
Parties who might serve as private attorneys-general in enforcing 
product safety, environmental, or consumer protection laws or policies 
may be especially susceptible to the effects examined in this 
paragraph.162 
Insofar as the legislation prescribes fee-shifting in diversity 
cases, it might also interfere with state prerogatives. To the extent 
that provision for attorney fee-shifting is considered to be a matter of 
state substantive law, Section 101 of the Common Sense Legal 
Reforms Act would federalize an important area which traditionally 
(and perhaps for constitutional reasons) has been left to the states.163 
Moreover, passage of Section 2 of the Attorney Accountability Act, like 
the proposals to amend Federal Rule 11 and Federal Evidentiary Rule 
702, would detrimentally affect the national rule revision process.164 
For example, congressional amendment of Rule 68 would avoid the 
national revision process and its provision for careful study of 
proposed changes in the rules and for public notice and comment, 
thereby subverting a critical purpose of the 1988 Judicial 
Improvements Act.16s 
F. Products Liability 
Section 103 of the CSLRA would have instituted several rather 
significant reforms of substantive products liability law.166 The 
aspects of that section which are most important to this Essay are the 
limitations on seller liability in numerous situations167 and the 
162. See note 145 and accompanying text. 
163. The Supreme Court has stated that attorney's fees are a matter of state substantive 
law. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 51-55 (1991) (recognizing that fee-shifting 
rules are a substantive state policy); Al,yeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31 (same); notes 81-83 
and accompanying text (arguing that Section 101 could have interfered with executive branch 
civil justice reform experimentation with attorney fee-shifting had Attorney General not found 
lack of government authority to enter into fee-shifting agreements). 
164. See notes 118-29, 142-50, and accompanying text; notes 159-60 and accompanying 
text. 
165. For instance, well-considered proposals to amend Rule 68 have been developed and are 
currently being considered by the Advisory Committee. See notes 156 and 160; notes 124-29 
and accompanying text. 
166. See H.R. 10 § 103 (cited in note 1). 
167. Id. § 103(B). 
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requirements that punitive damages only be awarded upon proof of 
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence and that such damages 
be capped.168 The Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform 
Act ("PLLRA'') essentially retains these provisions and introduces a 
number of additional substantive and procedural changes.169 The new 
features of that bill which are most relevant to this Essay are the 
imposition of defenses to products liability actions and a special Rule 
11 governing frivolous products litigation.110 
The reasons advanced for restricting seller liability are that 
sellers are sued in a substantial percentage of products cases but are 
found liable in only a tiny number.171 The rationale for imposing limi-
tations on punitive damages is that permitting juries to award these 
damages, particularly under unclear or insufficiently rigorous 
standards, unfairly exposes defendants to excessive liability.172 The 
reasons afforded for the alcohol-use, misuse, and alteration defenses 
are to encourage more careful consumer use of products and to limit 
defendants' exposure to liability to situations which defendants can 
control.173 Imposition of a special Rule 11 in products actions is 
justified by the ostensible need to deter frivolous suits.174 
Restricting seller liability can deprive plaintiffs of local 
defendants that have profitted from the sale of allegedly defective 
products; in some caess, these are the only parties that plaintiffs may 
be able to hold responsible for their injuries.175 The problem with 
168. Id. § 103(C). See generally Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Historical 
Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269 
(1993) (providing historical and empirical information on punitive damages). See generally 
Symposium, Punitive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation: Strong Medicine or 
Poison Pill?, 39 Vtll. L. Rev. 353 (1994). 
169. H.R. 956 (cited in note 1). 
170. Id. §§ 103-104 (imposing defenses); id.§ 105 (governing frivolous products litigation). 
Section 106 includes a statute of repose; Section 102B precludes strict liability actions for 
commercial loss; Section 107 prescribes litigation involving foreign products; Section 201 limits 
punitive damage awards against drug manufacturers; and Section 202 limits liability of health 
care providers. 
171. See Wade, Schwartz, Kelly, and Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases and 
Materials on Torts at 795 n. 4 (cited in note 102). 
172. Similar ideas underlie limitations on liability for health care providers and drug 
manufacturers. See note 170. 
173. The latter reason and fairness principles ostensibly support the imposition of a statute 
of repose and limitations on drug manufacturer and health care provider liability. See note 170; 
Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751P.2d470, 482-83 (1988) (recognizing majority rule 
of negligence for prescription drug manufacturers). 
174. See note 170; notes 32-42, 118-29, and accompanying text. 
175. The limitation on joint liability for noneconomic damages could exacerbate this situ-
ation. H.R. 10 § 103(D) (cited in note 1); H.R. 956 § 203 (cited in note 1). Section 102 of H.R. 
956 makes sellers liable when manufacturers are not subject to service or cannot pay 
judgments, while making sellers liable for express warranties. The defenses and the statute of 
1995] LEGAL REFORMS 733 
imposing limitations on punitive damages in products liability and 
medical malpractice cases is the loss of deterrence and punishment 
that could be realized in those instances in which they are warranted. 
These, and other, components of Section 103 of the CSLRA and of the 
PLLRA may reduce federal court access and have related adverse 
effects, such as limiting the number of cases in which plaintiffs serve 
the positive function of private attorneys-general, as mentioned 
above.176 
The provisions of Section 103 and of the PLLRA will probably 
have additional detrimental impacts that are analogous to some 
deleterious effects which other aspects of these two measures and 
features of the AAA and the SLRA would impose. Substantive and 
procedural products liability law, including punitive damages awards, 
has traditionally been a matter of state law. For instance, limiting 
recovery for commercial loss to contractual and commercial remedies 
would modify the substantive law of approximately five states which 
provide for strict liability in tort.177 Insofar as Section 103 of the 
CSLRA and the provisions of the PLLRA address these issues, they 
will interfere with the prerogatives of state supreme courts and 
legislatures. Perhaps the most egregious example of the legislation's 
intrusive nature is its imposition of a special Rule 11 in products 
liability cases even for states that have eschewed the adoption of a 
Rule 11 modelled on Federal Rule 11.178 To the extent that the 
legislation would change the substantive law of products liability, it 
will also disrupt the ongoing efforts of the American Law Institute to 
fmalize Section 402A of the Restatement Third.179 Finally, the 
congressional proposals cover only a small percentage of the issues 
that arise in products liability litigation so that none of the bills 
introduced will afford the type of national, uniform system of products 
repose will complicate the recovery efforts by plaintiffs, many of whom have been badly injured 
when using in reasonably foreseeable ways products which manufacturers might have designed 
more safely. 
176. See notes 145, 162, and accompanying text. The restrictions on noneconomic damages 
and the limitations on drug manufacturers' liability could disproportionately disadvantage 
women pursuing mass tort remedies. See Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad, His and Her 
Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1-5 (1995). See also notes 170, 
173, and 175. 
177. See, for example, Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes, 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334, 
337 (1982); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 267 A2d 305, 312-13 (1965). See 
generally East River S.S. Co. v. Delaval Transamerica, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
178. New York and Massachusetts have not adopted such a Rule 11. See also note 170. 
179. See notes 105-10 and accompanying text. 
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liability law which some of the legislation's proponents have 
advocated. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE 
Congress should reject or delay the adoption of the Common 
Sense Legal Reforms Act and the Attorney Accountability Act, the 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, and the Common Sense Product 
Liability and Legal Reform Act that passed the House of 
Representatives during the week of March 6, 1995, for numerous 
reasons stated above. Perhaps most important, implementation of the 
. CSLRA and the other legislation will interfere with, disrupt, or 
jeopardize a number of ongoing reform initiatives. Congressional 
passage in 1990 of the Civil Justice Reform Act within two years of 
the Judicial Improvements Act's enactment trenchantly illustrates 
the risks of legislating without sufficient appreciation of earlier 
reforms. Even though the federal judiciary and Congress had 
identified local procedural proliferation as an important problem, and 
although Congress had passed the 1988 JIA to address specifically 
this difficulty, Congress enacted the 1990 CJRA, which effectively 
suspended those aspects of the JIA which were meant to treat 
proliferation before they were even implemented. 
If Congress passes the CSLRA, the AAA, the SLRA, or the 
PLLRA now, the legislation will interfere with some features of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act before they have been fully implemented and 
certainly before the results of procedural experimentation under the 
CJRA have been thoroughly evaluated. Passage of the CSLRA or the 
other legislation would disrupt additional continuing reform efforts, 
such as the national rule revisors' endeavors to amend Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 and the American Law Institute's attempt to adopt 
a Restatement (Third) of Torts.180 
The interference with these reforms and the imposition of new 
requirements will increase complexity, expense, and delay in federal 
civil litigation. The federal judiciary will have to interpret and apply 
the strictures, while attorneys and parties must discover, understand, 
and comply with the requirements. Indeed, CJRA experimentation 
and the recently-adopted 1993 Federal Rules amendments may have 
exhausted the tolerance of the bench and bar for procedural change; 
180. See notes 105-10, 137, and accompanying text. 
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the passage of the CSLRA, the AAA, the SLRA, or the PLLRA could 
well constitute systemic overload. 
Congress should also reject or delay the enactment of the 
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act and the other legislation because 
many of the legislation's procedural and substantive requirements 
will have adverse effects in specific civil cases. For instance, the 
provisions in the CSLRA and in the AAA relating to Rule 11, to fee-
shifting, and to settlement offers will restrict court access for lawyers 
and parties whose lack of power and money makes them risk averse. 
The impacts of disrupting processes and of imposing new 
requirements mentioned in the three paragraphs above will have 
similar effects, such as increasing expense and delay, in many 
individual lawsuits. Indeed, the Chair of the American Bar 
Association Litigation Section aptly summarized many of the ideas 
already stated when he characterized the proposed reforms as a "sort 
of a hodgepodge attempt to address perceived problems with the legal 
system. Quick-and-dirty solutions shouldn't be imposed where a more 
thoughtful approach is clearly called for."181 
If Congress believes that the CSLRA or the other legislation 
will have few detrimental effects in particular cases, on continuing 
reforms, or on the civil justice process, or if it decides to proceed for 
additional reasons, Congress should seriously consider several alter-
natives. Congress should not adopt the legislation's provisions that 
will disrupt ongoing reform endeavors or it should at least suspend 
passage until current efforts have terminated and their results have 
been analyzed. 
In less than a year, the ninety-four districts will have essen-
tially concluded the most ambitious experimentation with civil ex-
pense and delay reduction procedures in the history of the federal 
courts, while the RAND Corporation will have systematically col-
lected, analyzed, and synthesized an enormous amount of empirical 
information on the efficacy of this experimentation.182 Congress will 
be able to undertake considerably more informed decision making 
regarding certain requirements in the Common Sense Legal Reforms 
Act, the Attorney Accountability Act, the Securities Litigation Reform 
181. Bole, Litigation News at 6 (cited in note 128) (quoting David C. Weiner). 
182. See Notes on Implementation of Plans accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1988 & Supp. 
1993) (prescribing experimentation and evaluation). See generally Terence Dunworth and 
James S. Kaka1ik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation of the Pilot Program of the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1303 (1994) (providing preliminary results of 
RAND's evaluation of the pilot program). 
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Act, and the Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act 
once Civil Justice Reform Act experimentation has been completed 
and rigorously assessed. Congress should remember that efforts to 
revise the Federal Rules without sufficient empirical data may have 
yielded several of the most controversial amendments in the Rules' 
half-century history.183 Awaiting the conclusion of the CJRA initiative 
could afford the concomitant benefit of rectifying or ameliorating the 
problems created by local procedural proliferation. Implementation of 
the Judicial Improvements Act's aspects which were directed at these 
complications, features which the CJRA essentially suspended, might 
be revived and concluded.184 
Congress should not enact requirements in the CSLRA or the 
other legislation that will conflict with continuing reform endeavors 
for a number of reasons. The requirements' effectuation might forfeit 
benefits to be derived from the reform efforts, could disrupt those 
initiatives, and may increase complexity, cost, and delay in civil cases. 
For instance, the adoption of special procedures for securities class 
actions could frustrate and even sacrifice the considerable effort ex-
pended to date on Rule 23's comprehensive amendment.185 The revi-
sion in the CSLRA and the AAA of Federal Rule 11 in ways that 
would reinstitute the very phenomena which the national rule revis-
ers found so troubling and assiduously labored to exclude from the 
provision less than two years ago would eviscerate the 1993 amend-
ment before the revision had an opportunity to work.186 Moreover, 
institution of the changes would unnecessarily compromise the na-
tional revision process at a critical juncture, when the authority and 
respect that it has long enjoyed have been seriously threatened.187 
Legislating in the substantive area of products liability could under-
cut the American Law Institute's efforts to craft an improved 
Restatement of Torts Third and interfere with state initiatives in the 
area of products liability.188 
Congress might also want to consider the advisability of en-
couraging experimentation with certain of the requirements included 
in the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act and the other legislation. 
183. See Burbank, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1925-27 (cited in note 35); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Discouery in Disarray: The Peroasiue Myth of Peroasiue Discouery, Abuse and the Consequences 
for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1994); Walker, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 456-
59 (cited in note 48). See also notes 31-41, 57-61, and accompanying text. 
184. See notes 27-29, 52-70, 90, and accompanying text. 
185. See notes 130-41, and accompanying text. 
186. See notes 32-51, 118-29, and accompanying text. 
187. See note 129 and accompanying text. 
188. See notes 99-110, 166-79, and accompanying text. 
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Congress should remember that many states are currently 
experimenting with numerous reforms.189 If Congress believes that 
these efforts are inadequate, it might want to sponsor some 
initiatives. For instance, Congress could prescribe experimentation 
with the thirty-day notice requirement or with fee-shifting that 
involves settlement offers in diversity cases in certain federal districts 
for a fixed period, although such experimentation might unfairly 
penalize some litigants in those courts or foster forum shopping. This 
program might be modeled on earlier projects involving court-annexed 
arbitration, which proceeded in numerous federal districts, 190 or on 
CJRA experimentation. Congress could correspondingly provide for 
broader experimentation by adopting a 1991 proposed amendment in 
Federal Rule 83 which the national rule revisors withdrew.191 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, and the Attorney 
Accountability Act, the Securities Litigation Reform Act, and the 
Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act that passed 
the House of Representatives during the week of March 6, 1995, 
would institute numerous procedural and substantive reforms that 
would have many adverse effects in individual cases, on continuing 
reform initiatives, and on the civil justice system. Congress should 
not pass this legislation, or should at least suspend those provisions 
which would interfere with ongoing reforms until these efforts have 
concluded. 
189. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
190. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988). See generally Barbara S. Meierhoefer, Court-Annexed 
Arbitration in Ten District Courts (Fed. Judicial Center, 1990) (examining arbitration in the 
mandatory pilot programs). 
191. I have suggested that congressional intervention in Rules revision is generally 
inadvisable. Nevertheless, congressional adoption of this change in Rule 83 may be appropriate 
because the rule revision entities had already proposed the amendment and because it would be 
preferable to have congressional authorization for this specific change. See A Leo Levin, Local 
Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Diuision of Power, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1585-87 
(1991). Districts that secured Judicial Conference approval would have been able te experiment 
for not greater than five years with local rules that conflicted with Federal Rules. Preliminary 
Draft of Proposed Amendments, 137 F.R.D. at 153 (cited in note 43). See also Tobias, 46 Stan. L. 
Rev. at 1616, 1633 (cited in note 2) (discussing the proposed 1991 amendment in Rule 83). 
